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ABSTRACT
In this paper we study two-sided matching markets in which
the participants do not fully know their preferences and need
to go through some costly deliberation process in order to
learn their preferences. We assume that such deliberations
are carried out via interviews, thus the problem is to find
a good strategy for interviews to be carried out in order to
minimize their use, whilst leading to a stable matching. One
way to evaluate the performance of an interview strategy is
to compare it against a na¨ıve algorithm that conducts all
interviews. We argue however that a more meaningful com-
parison would be against an optimal oﬄine algorithm that
has access to agents’ preference orderings under complete
information. We show that, unless P=NP, no oﬄine algo-
rithm can compute the optimal interview strategy in poly-
nomial time. If we are additionally aiming for a particular
stable matching, we provide restricted settings under which
efficient optimal oﬄine algorithms exist.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Two-sided matching markets model many practical set-
tings, such as corporate hiring and university admission [6,
3]. In the classical stable marriage problem participants are
partitioned into two disjoint sets, and each participant on
one side of the market wishes to be matched to a candidate
from the other side of the market and has preferences over
potential matches. A matching is called stable if no pair of
participants would prefer to leave their assigned partners to
pair with each other. Gale and Shapley’s seminal paper [1]
proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a stable
matching; a rich literature has developed since.
A key assumption in much of this literature is that all mar-
ket participants know their full preference orderings. How-
ever, as markets grow large (e.g., in the hospital-resident
matching market or college admission market [1, 3]) it quickly
becomes impractical for participants to assess their precise
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preference rankings. Instead, participants usually start out
with some partial knowledge about their preferences and
need to perform some deliberation in order to learn their
precise preference ordering. In this paper we assume that
deliberations are carried out via interviews. Interviews are
usually costly, therefore we wish to minimize their usage.
Any interviewing strategy leads to refinements of the par-
tial orders contained in the original problem instance that
represented uncertainty over the true preferences. A key aim
could be to carry out sufficient interviews so as to arrive at
an instance that admits a super-stable matching µ. Infor-
mally speaking, super-stability ensures that µ will be stable
regardless of how the remaining uncertainty is resolved. The
original instance need not admit a super-stable matching
(see [2] for an example) but we are guaranteed that a super-
stable matching is always achievable (e.g., by conducting all
possible interviews). We seek a good strategy that conducts
as few interviews as possible so as to obtain a refined in-
stance that admits a super-stable matching. In general any
such strategy will be an online algorithm, since the next
interview to be carried out might depend on the results of
previous ones.
2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
SMP, SMTI and SMT.
In an instance of the Stable Marriage problem with Par-
tially ordered preferences (SMP), there are two sets of agents,
namely a set of men M and a set of women W . Each agent
a finds a subset of agents on the opposite side of the market
acceptable – we refer to these as a’s acceptable candidates.
An agent a’s preferences over his/her acceptable candidates
need not be strict. That is, given two candidates, a might
be indifferent between them. We denote by I an instance of
SMP, and by pa the partial orders that represent the pref-
erence ordering of agent a. A matching µ is a pairing of
men and women such that each man is paired with at most
one woman and vice versa, and no agent is matched to an
unacceptable partner. A well studied special case of SMP is
the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists
(SMTI). In SMTI, each agent has a partition of acceptable
candidates into ties such that he or she is indifferent between
the candidates in the same tie but has a strict preference or-
dering over the ties. The Stable Marriage problem with Ties
(SMT) is the special case of SMTI in which each man finds
each woman acceptable and vice versa.
Interviews to refine the partial orders.
In a given instance I of SMP in this paper, we assume
that the partial preference ordering profile represents the
agents’ initial information state. That is, agents may not
have enough information initially in order to rank their ac-
ceptable candidates in strict order. However each agent a
has a strict preference ordering a over his or her acceptable
candidates, although s/he may not initially be aware of this
entire ordering. We let M,W denote the strict (true un-
derlying) preference ordering profile of all agents. The task
of the agents is to learn enough information about their ac-
ceptable candidates in order to refine their preferences, in a
manner consistent with M,W , to obtain an SMP instance
I ′ that admits a super-stable matching µ (thus µ will be
stable with respect to M,W ).
Following the model introduced in [4], we assume that in-
stances can be refined through interviews. Each interview
pairs one man m with one woman w. An interview is infor-
mative to both parties involved. When agent a interviews `
candidates, this results in a new refined SMP instance which
is exactly the same as I except that a now has a strict pref-
erence ordering over the ` interviewed candidates.
Note that not all refinements of I can be reached by a
set of interviews. We say that an SMP instance I ′ is an
interview-compatible refinement of I if I ′ can be refined from
I using interviews. We define the cost of I ′ to be the mini-
mum number of interviews required to refine I into I ′.
Definitions of the interview minimization problems.
The motivating problem is as follows: given an instance I
of SMP, find an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of mini-
mum cost such that I ′ admits a super-stable matching. Since
the result of one interview might influence which interview/s
to carry out next, any strategy for carrying out interviews
should be regarded as an online algorithm. Towards comput-
ing bounds for the competitive ratio of an online algorithm,
the oﬄine scenario is of interest, and that is what we consider
in what follows. In the oﬄine case, the mechanism designer
is given M,W , the strict (true underlying) preference or-
dering profile of the agents, and would like to compute an
optimal interviewing schedule, i.e., an interview-compatible
refinement I ′ of I, such that M,W refines I ′. This is re-
flected in the definition of the following problem, named
Min-ICR, which is an abbreviation for “Minimum-cost In-
terview Compatible Refinement problem”.
Definition 1. An instance of Min-ICR comprises a tu-
ple (I,M,W ), where I is an instance of SMP and M,W
is a strict preference ordering profile that refines I. The
problem is to find an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of
I such that (i) M,W refines I ′, (ii) I ′ admits a super-
stable matching, and (iii) I ′ is of minimum cost amongst
interview-compatible refinements that satisfy (i) and (ii).
It is sometimes the case that we aim for a particular
matching, stable under M,W , that has some desirable prop-
erties, for example it is preferred to every other stable match-
ing by women. The oﬄine problem can then be viewed as
a restricted variant of Min-ICR where, in addition to I and
M,W , we are also equipped with a matching µ. This is
reflected in the definition of the following problem, named
Min-ICR-Exact, which is an abbreviation for “Minimum-
cost Interview Compatible Refinement problem with Exact
matching”.
Definition 2. An instance of Min-ICR-Exact comprises
a tuple (I,M,W , µ), where I is an instance of SMP, M,W
is a strict preference ordering profile that refines I, and µ is
a matching that is weakly stable w.r.t. M,W . The problem
is to find an interview-compatible refinement I ′ of I, such
that (i) M,W refines I ′, (ii) µ is super-stable in I ′, and (iii)
I ′ is of minimum cost amongst interview-compatible refine-
ments of I that satisfy (i) and (ii).
3. RESULTS
In the full version of this paper [5], we prove that Min-ICR
and Min-ICR-Exact are NP-hard even if I is an instance
of SMTI in which each tie is of size at most 3. Further,
we prove that both problems are NP-hard even for SMT
instances, and even if all men are indifferent between all
women. The hardness proofs are by reduction from the Ver-
tex Cover problem (VC).
We then explore the tractability of Min-ICR-Exact un-
der various restricted settings, using a reverse reduction from
Min-ICR-Exact to VC to prove our claims. We show that
Min-ICR-Exact is solvable in polynomial time under three
different restrictions: (i) if one side has fully known strict
preference ordering, (ii) if I is an instance of SMTI in which
ties are of size at most 2, and (iii) if I is an instance of of
SMTI in which all men are endowed with the same ties, as
well as all women.
4. FUTUREWORK
The main direction is to investigate the online case, where
the true underlying preferences are not known to the mecha-
nism designer, with respect to measures such as the compet-
itive ratio. Furthermore, an important question is whether
Min-ICR is polynomial-time solvable under some restricted
setting. Extending the known results on interviewing in sta-
ble marriage markets to many-to-one markets such as col-
lege admission is another important future direction. It is
also interesting to study online algorithms in a setting where
elicitation is taking place via comparison queries.
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